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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-3151 
 
C & K COAL COMPANY, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
VIRGINIA TAYLOR, widow of William Taylor, LAMP COAL 
COMPANY, OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY, and 
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
 
ON APPEAL FROM A PETITION 
FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION AND ORDER 
OF THE BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD 
DATED JANUARY 8, 1998 
(BLA No. 95-1531) 
 
Argued November 17, 1998 
 
Before: McKEE, RENDELL, and WEIS, Circuit Judges. 
 
Filed: January 25, 1999 
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       John B. Bechtol, Esquire 
       Bechtol Lee & Eberhardt 
       The Ewart Building, 2nd Floor 
       925 Liberty Avenue 
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       Mark S. Flynn, Esquire (ARGUED) 
        Director, Office of Workers' 
        Compensation Programs 
       Marvin Krislov, Esquire 
        Deputy Solicitor for National 
        Operations 
       Allen H. Feldman, Esquire 
        Associate Solicitor for Special 
        Appellate and Supreme Court 
        Litigation 
       Nathaniel Spiller, Esquire 
        Deputy Associate Solicitor 
       United States Department of Labor 
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       Room N-2700 
       Washington, D.C. 20210 
 
       Attorneys for Respondent Director, 
       Office of Workers' Compensation 
       Programs 
 
       Mark E. Solomons, Esquire 
        (ARGUED) 
       Laura Metcoff Klaus, Esquire 
       Arter & Hadden, LLP 
       Suite 400K 
       1801 K Street, N.W. 
       Washington, D.C. 20006 
 
       Attorneys for Respondents Lamp 
       Coal Company and Old Republic 
       Insurance Company 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue in this Petition for Review is whether the 
successor operator of a coal mine is responsible for 
payment of Black Lung benefits to a long-time employee of 
the mine who worked for the successor for only a few 
months. We conclude that, under the Black Lung Benefits 
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Act and implementing regulations, the successor operator, 
as opposed to the prior operator, is liable. We also decide 
that, despite inexcusable and prolonged delay in the 
administrative process, responsibility for payment should 
not be shifted to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund 
under the circumstances presented here. Accordingly, we 
will deny the Petition for Review. 
 
By Friday, August 23, 1974, William Taylor had worked 
as a coal miner for Lamp Coal Company ("Lamp") for 
approximately twenty-seven years. On that day, Lamp 
terminated all of its employees and sold its assets to 
Cambria Coal Company, a subsidiary of C & K Coal 
Company. Taylor returned to work the following Monday as 
a supervisor for C & K and he worked in that position until 
November 23, 1974 when he retired. 
 
Taylor applied for Black Lung benefits in January 1975, 
listing Lamp as his most recent employer. The Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs ("Office") preliminarily 
approved the application effective January 1, 1975 and 
notified Lamp that it was responsible for payment. Lamp 
objected, informing the Office that it was not Taylor's most 
recent employer. 
 
Taylor's Social Security records confirmed that C & K was 
his last employer but the Office, unaware of the sale and 
potential successor liability, determined that C & K could 
not be responsible because Taylor had not worked for that 
employer for a year as required by regulation. Lamp then 
formally controverted the claim. 
 
In September 1977, having learned of the sale of assets, 
the Office notified C & K that it was the responsible 
operator. C & K then controverted the claim. In November 
1977, the Office acknowledged the objection but informed C 
& K of its right to have the miner examined and forwarded 
a copy of the evidence file. In January 1978, after 
development of additional uncertainty over the sale, the 
claim was remanded to the Office at the Director's request 
for a redetermination. 
 
Pending designation of a responsible operator, Taylor 
received benefits from the Black Lung Disability Trust 
Fund. He died in May 1980, and his widow continued to 
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receive benefits from the Fund. One month after Taylor's 
death, the Office again designated C & K as the responsible 
operator. More questions arose, however, and after further 
consideration, in 1981 the Office pointed back at Lamp. 
This time, Lamp's insurer objected. Four more years passed 
before the Office concluded in 1986 that C & K, as Lamp's 
successor, was the responsible operator. 
 
The matter was eventually assigned to an ALJ for a 
hearing in 1988. Both operators were named and appeared 
as potentially responsible parties. They convinced the ALJ 
that the lengthy procedural delay had violated their 
respective due process rights. The ALJ ultimately dismissed 
both C & K and Lamp and assigned liability to the Trust 
Fund. 
 
The Director appealed to the Benefits Review Board. Five 
years later, in February 1993, the Board reversed and 
remanded to the ALJ with directions to consider both the 
widow's entitlement and C & K's liability. On August 25, 
1995, the ALJ awarded benefits to the widow and held C & 
K responsible. The Board affirmed, both initially and upon 
reconsideration. This petition for review followed. 
 
We review this final order of the Board pursuant to 33 
U.S.C. S 921(c), as incorporated into the Black Lung 
Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. S 932(a). Factual determinations by 
the Board will be upheld if supported by substantial 
evidence; questions of law receive plenary review. See 33 
U.S.C. S 921(b)(3); Venicassa v. Consolidation Coal Co., 137 
F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
The widow's entitlement to benefits is not contested in 
this petition. Rather, the only question is the source of 
payment. C & K disputes its responsibility and contends 
alternatively that the extended administrative delay violated 
its due process rights. 
 
I. 
 
The Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. S 901 et seq., 
seeks to hold operators liable for the costs of 
pneumoconiosis. Because miners often shifted between 
employers and operators went out of business, became 
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insolvent or merged with others, industry realities 
necessitated some complex rules for identifying a 
responsible operator. The long latency period and 
complications associated with pneumoconiosis posed 
additional problems in terms of the equitable assignment of 
responsibility. Anticipating situations in which it would be 
impossible to trace or assess the responsible operator, 
Congress established the Trust Fund. See 26 U.S.C. S 9501. 
Financed by the coal industry, the Fund becomes a source 
of benefit payments only when a responsible operator 
cannot be identified, has gone out of business or is 
financially incapable of assuming liability. See 26 U.S.C. 
S 9501(d). 
 
Liability generally attaches to the affected miner's most 
recent employer. Foreseeing problems attendant upon the 
transfer of mine ownership, however, Congress specified in 
30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(1) that: "the operator of a coal mine who 
. . . acquired such mine or substantially all the assets 
thereof, from a . . . `prior operator' . . . shall be liable for 
. . . the payment of all benefits which would have been 
payable by the prior operator . . . with respect to miners 
previously employed by such prior operator as if the 
acquisition had not occurred and the prior operator had 
continued to be an operator of a coal mine." A more specific 
provision, aimed directly at the sale of mining assets, 
provides: "[i]f an operator ceases to exist by reason of a sale 
of substantially all his or her assets . . . the successor 
operator . . . shall be treated as the operator to whom this 
section applies." See 30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(3)(D). 
 
Pursuant to statutory direction, the Secretary of Labor 
duly promulgated regulations to determine "whether 
pneumoconiosis arose out of employment in a particular 
coal mine or mines" and to identify the responsible 
operator. See 30 U.S.C. S 932(h); 20 C.F.R. SS 725.490 - 
725.493. The regulation at issue, 20 C.F.R. S 725.493, 
designates as the responsible operator the employer with 
which the miner has the most recent period of cumulative 
employment of not less than one year. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 725.493(a)(1); see also Appendix for text of 20 C.F.R. 
S 725.493(a)(1), (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(ii), (a)(4). 
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Echoing the Act, however, the paragraph immediately 
following provides that the successor operator "shall be 
liable for . . . benefits which would have been payable by 
the prior operator with respect to miners previously 
employed by such prior operator as if the acquisition had 
not occurred and the prior operator had continued to be a 
coal mine operator." See 20 C.F.R. S 725.493(a)(2)(i); see 
also 30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(1). The one-year minimum 
employment rule is expressly made "[s]ubject to" the 
provisions of this paragraph. See 20 C.F.R. S 725.493(a)(1) 
("Subject to the provisions of paragraph[ ] (a)(2)"). Moreover, 
as the more specific provision, paragraph (a)(2), by its 
placement and content, operates as an exception to the 
one-year minimum employment rule. Thus, the successor 
situation, expressly covered by paragraph (a)(2)(i), is not 
governed by the rule set forth in paragraph (a)(1), i.e., the 
minimum employment rule. 
 
In addition to these specific successor operator rules, the 
Act and regulations establish a framework for determining 
which, as between the prior and successor operator, is 
"primarily liable" for the payment of benefits. See 30 U.S.C. 
S 932(i)(2); 20 C.F.R. S 725.493(a)(2)(ii). Noting that 
Congress sought to prevent an operator from circumventing 
responsibility by entering into corporate or other business 
transactions which "make the assessment of liability 
against that operator a financial or legal impossibility," 
subsection (a)(2)(ii) of the regulation provides that a "prior 
operator . . . shall remain primarily liable for the payment 
of benefits under this part predicated on employment with 
the prior operator" if it is able to assume financial 
responsibility through insurance or otherwise. See 20 
C.F.R. S 725.493(a)(2)(ii); see also 30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(2). 
 
Applying these statutory and regulatory provisions, we 
must determine whether Lamp, as the prior operator, or C 
& K, as the successor operator, is responsible. The 
Director, seeking to uphold assignment of liability to C & K, 
contends that under the regulations, because it employed 
Taylor, albeit for less than a year, C & K is primarily liable 
as the successor. Lamp, in agreement with the Director, 
maintains that employment by a successor operator 
overrides application of the one-year minimum employment 
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rule. Old Republic, Lamp's insurer, adopts its insured's 
interpretation of the regulation. 
 
C & K attacks the ALJ finding that Lamp ceased doing 
business upon sale of its assets and, on that basis, argues 
that Lamp remains primarily liable. In addition, C & K 
contends that even if it is a successor, it is not responsible 
because it employed Taylor for less than one year. Finally, 
should we agree that it is responsible, C & K asserts that 
Lamp had agreed to indemnify it against any claims 
existing at the time of the sale. 
 
We are persuaded that the Director's position is correct. 
In looking first, of course, to the statute, we observe that 
the Act clearly specifies that the successor operator is 
responsible for benefits which "would have been payable" 
by the prior operator for miners previously employed by the 
prior operator as if the prior operator had continued to 
operate the mine. See 30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(1). There is no 
dispute that Taylor previously worked for Lamp and was 
later employed by C & K following the change of ownership. 
Section 932(i)(1), read in isolation, unmistakably 
contemplates assigning responsibility to C & K. 
 
The paragraph immediately following, however, 
complicates matters because it states that "nothing in 
[subsection 932(i)] shall relieve any prior operator of any 
liability under this section." See 30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(2). 
Together, these provisions of the Act might be read to pose 
a contradiction between assigning liability to the successor 
under (i)(1), yet specifically retaining liability in the prior 
operator under (i)(2). 
 
The Secretary's regulation, however, eliminates any 
apparent inconsistency. Under 20 C.F.R. S 725.493(a)(2)(ii), 
the successor becomes responsible for miners previously 
employed by the prior operator once they are hired by the 
successor following the change in ownership. If, however, 
the miner did not work for the successor, the prior operator 
remains primarily liable. In that situation, primary liability 
only shifts to the successor if the prior operator is 
financially incapable of assuming payments. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 725.493(a)(2)(ii). 
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Translated into the circumstances of this case, because 
Taylor worked for Lamp and continued to work in the mine 
after C & K's subsidiary took it over, C & K becomes 
primarily liable. In other words, once C & K purchased 
Lamp's assets, thereby becoming Lamp's successor, it was 
as if Taylor had worked for C & K twenty-seven years and 
three months. Only if C & K could not otherwise assume 
liability would Lamp remain primarily liable. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 725.493(a)(2)(iii). 
 
That Taylor worked for C & K for less than a year does 
not alter the outcome. The regulation's one-year minimum 
employment rule is specifically made subject to the special 
rule for successors. See 20 C.F.R. S 725.493(a)(1), (a)(2)(i). 
Moreover, the one-year rule is not contained in the Act, 
which, to the contrary, dictates a special rule for 
successors. See 30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(1), (i)(3)(D). We agree with 
the Director's interpretation of the regulation, one that does 
not conflict with the Act, and therefore hold that C & K is 
primarily liable. 
 
We reject, as based on an erroneous reading of the Act, 
C & K's argument that if indeed Lamp continued as a viable 
entity following the sale of substantially all of its mining 
assets, Lamp remains primarily liable. Neither the basic 
successor rule, 30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(1), nor its more specific 
formulation, 30 U.S.C. S 932(i)(3)(D), require total cessation 
of the prior operator's business before the successor 
becomes potentially liable. In this situation, both operators 
were potentially liable; the question was whether there 
existed any basis for assigning primary liability to C & K. 
 
We must also deny C & K's plea to apportion liability. We 
do this despite the intrinsic appeal of allocating liability to 
reflect the fact that Taylor had worked for Lamp for 27 
years and for C & K only three months. 
 
The Act authorized the Secretary to "establish[by 
regulation] standards for apportioning liability for benefits." 
30 U.S.C. S 932(h). The Secretary proposed an 
apportionment-based regulation in 1972, but withdrew it 
amidst adverse comment. See 37 Fed. Reg. 18,167-68 
(Sept. 7, 1972). Apportionment would have introduced a 
substantial degree of complexity and it appeared that fixed 
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guidelines would better serve the mining industry. We note 
a ready analogy in the commercial field where it is 
recognized that arbitrary rules known in advance, even if 
inequitable in some specific instances, are on the whole 
necessary for the efficient conduct of business. Accordingly, 
in the absence of a regulation permitting apportionment, 
C & K must bear the full burden of payment. 
 
II. 
 
Should it be the responsible operator, C & K argues 
vigorously that the administrative delay has denied it due 
process. The remedy, C & K urges, is a total transfer of 
liability to the Trust Fund. 
 
It appears that the Office was aware as early as 1977 of 
the uncertainty surrounding the responsible operator issue. 
As noted earlier, however, eleven years of wrangling passed 
before all potential parties appeared before an ALJ for a 
basic evidentiary hearing. 
 
In one of the appeals to the Board, the Director did not 
file his brief for two years beyond the time set by the 
Board's rules. See 20 C.F.R. SS 802.210-802.217. In a 
subsequent appeal, the Director was again delinquent and 
again the Board did not enforce its rules. The Board's 
ultimate decision, upon reconsideration, to affirm was not 
docketed until January 8, 1998. 
 
Thus, more than 23 years elapsed from the initial 
application to the date of the responsible operator 
determination. Fortunately for the Taylors, interim 
payments have been made from the Trust Fund. 
 
Although we recognize that inadequate information 
initially hampered the Office's ability to grasp the 
relationship among Taylor, Lamp and C & K, we are 
appalled that this relatively straightforward issue bounced 
three times between the Office and an ALJ, accompanied by 
unnecessary delays. Similarly, we cannot ignore that the 
Board compounded the delay by permitting the Director to 
flout its rules that set time limits for filing briefs. 
 
Unfortunately, as we have observed in the past, such 
"dismaying inefficiency" has long characterized the 
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administration of this Act. See, e.g. , Venicassa, 137 F.3d at 
198 & n.2 (12 years delay compounded by error of the 
Office); Lango v. Director, OWCP, 104 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 
1997) (benefits awarded after 14 years); see also Amax Coal 
Co. v. Franklin, 957 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) ("As so 
often in black lung cases, the processing of th[is] claim has 
been protracted scandalously . . . ."). We publicized our 
dismay in Lango, hoping to bring the Act's poor 
administration "to the attention of authorities who can do 
something about it." 104 F.3d at 576. 
 
The tortured route that this matter took towards 
resolution simply cannot be justified. Counsel for the 
current Director, with admirable candor, did not try to do 
so at oral argument. Rather, he assured us that steps have 
been taken in the last few years to ensure that Black Lung 
claims are expeditiously resolved. Statistics reveal that the 
number and age of pending Black Lung cases has, indeed, 
steadily decreased. We cannot hope but that this trend 
continues. Recent progress, however, is of little consolation 
to C & K and we must consider its due process challenge 
under the deplorable circumstances here. 
 
In large part, we view the proposed remedy for the 
asserted due process challenge violation through our 
perception of the Trust Fund's purpose and nature. 
Congress intended operators to bear the costs of 
pneumoconiosis whenever feasible. See S. Rep. No. 95-209, 
at 9 (1977), reprinted in House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 
96th Cong., Black Lung Benefits Reform Act and Black 
Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, 612 (Comm. Print 
1979); see also Director, OWCP v. Oglebay Norton Co., 877 
F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (6th Cir. 1989). The Trust Fund exists 
as a fail-safe mechanism and it is not a creature of the 
Department of Labor, the Office or the Board. See 26 U.S.C. 
S 9501. 
 
Given the dismal history of the Act's administration, it is 
not hard to envision how quickly a policy of liberal transfer 
of claims to the Fund would deplete its resources. Such a 
remedy, it is generally held, should only be invoked where 
prejudice other than mere delay has been demonstrated. 
For example, in Venicassa, we found that the claimant, 
forced to litigate his entitlement to benefits twice, had been 
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prejudiced by the ten-year delay and improper designation 
of the responsible operator. See 137 F.3d at 202-03. In 
those circumstances, rather than allow the litigation to 
drag on, we concluded that the Trust Fund should assume 
liability. See id. at 203-04. 
 
In Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 137 F.3d 799 
(4th Cir. 1998), the alleged responsible operator was 
notified 17 years after notice could have been given and 
three years after the claimant died. The Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit concluded that because the 
inexcusable delay resulted in the loss of an opportunity to 
mount a proper defense, the operator had been denied due 
process. See id. at 808. In light of the substantial prejudice 
shown, payments were assigned to the Trust Fund. See id. 
 
Oglebay dealt with a similar delay for which an ALJ had 
seen fit to transfer liability to the Trust Fund. See 877 F.2d 
at 1302. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
disagreed with that drastic approach, because "none of the 
parties . . . would suffer substantial prejudice by a further 
remand." Id. at 1304. The claimant had been receiving 
interim benefits from the Trust Fund and the operator had 
access to substantial medical evidence sufficient to provide 
an adequate defense on remand. See id. Oglebay simply did 
not involve prejudice comparable to that encountered in 
Venicassa and Lane Hollow. 
 
The case before us is similar to Oglebay. C & K was 
notified in 1977 that its status as a responsible operator 
was under consideration. Thus, it had three years to 
procure appropriate medical evidence before Taylor died. 
On this record, we see no prejudice other than that 
attendant on the failure to confirm the liability that had 
been asserted years earlier. C & K makes some vague 
reference to harm in connection with contractual rights it 
may have had to indemnification from Lamp, but, as that 
position is not clearly articulated, we do not find it 
persuasive. 
 
Accordingly, we will not hold that this delay, albeit 
inexcusable, ipso facto establishes a violation of C & K's 
due process rights. The fact that the delay cannot be 
attributed to the Trust Fund is an important additional 
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factor. Foisting liability on the Trust Fund where no 
demonstrable prejudice has occurred would run counter to 
Congressional intent by effectively shifting responsibility for 
the Office's and the Board's failings onto contributing 
operators. We will not take that action when there is an 
operator legally responsible and financially capable of 
assuming payments. 
 
We conclude that C & K is the legally responsible 
operator and that, while the delay present in this case 
cannot be condoned, neither its occurrence nor its 
consequences should be visited upon an innocent party, 
the Trust Fund. 
 
Accordingly, the petition for review will be denied. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
20 C.F.R. S 725.493 (1998). Criteria for identifying a 
responsible operator. 
 
(a)(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (a)(2) and 
(3) of this section, and provided that the conditions of 
S 725.492(a)(2) through (a)(4) are met, the operator or other 
employer with which the miner had the most recent periods 
of cumulative employment of not less than 1 year, as 
determined in accordance with paragraph (b) of this 
section, shall be the responsible operator. 
 
(2)(i) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, if 
the operator described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section 
was an operator of a mine or mines or the owner of the 
assets thereof on or after January 1, 1970, (a "prior 
operator") and on or after January 1, 1970, transferred 
such mine or mines or substantially all of the assets thereof 
to another operator (a "successor operator"), such 
successor operator shall be liable for and shall secure the 
payment of all benefits which would have been payable by 
the prior operator with respect to miners previously 
employed by such prior operator as if the acquisition had 
not occurred and the prior operator had continued to be a 
coal mine operator. A lessor of a coal mine may be 
considered a prior or successor operator in accordance with 
this subpart. 
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(ii) The stated congressional objective supporting section 
422(i) of the Act is to prevent a coal operator from 
circumventing liability under this part by entering into 
corporate or other business transactions which make the 
assessment of liability against that operator afinancial or 
legal impossibility. Accordingly, a prior operator under 
paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section, which transfers a mine or 
mines or substantially all the assets thereof, shall remain 
primarily liable for the payment of benefits under this part 
predicated on employment with the prior operator if such 
prior operator meets the conditions of S 725.492(a)(2) and 
(a)(4). If the conditions in S 725.492(a)(2) and (a)(4) are not 
met, the successor operator shall, if appropriate, be liable 
for the payment of such benefits. 
 
. . . .  
 
(4) If there is no operator which meets the conditions of 
paragraphs (a)(1) or (2) of this section, the responsible 
operator shall be considered to be the operator with which 
the miner had the latest periods of cumulative employment 
of not less than 1 year, subject to the provisions of 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section and provided that the 
conditions of S 725.492(a)(2)-(a)(4) are met. 
 
. . . . 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                13 
